This paper studies mean field linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) social optimum control for mean field models with a common uncertain drift, where both dynamics and costs of agents involve coupled terms. We adopt a robust optimization approach where all the agents view the uncertain drift as an adversarial player. Based on the social variational derivation and the person-by-person optimality principle, we construct an auxiliary optimal control problem for a representative agent. By solving the auxiliary problem combined with consistent mean field approximations, a set of decentralized strategies is designed and further shown to be asymptotically robust optimal.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mean field games and control have drawn increasing attention in many fields including system control, applied mathematics and economics [6] , [8] , [13] . The mean field game involves a very large population of small interacting players with the feature that while the influence of each one is negligible, the impact of the overall population is significant. Mean field models have widely appeared in economics, engineering, and social sciences, for instance, output planning in large markets [22] , dynamic advertising competition [11] , wireless communication networks [18] , and voluntary vaccination games [4] .
By now, mean field games and control have been intensively studied in the LQG (linear-quadratic-Gaussian) framework [18] , [19] , [24] , [34] , [5] , [27] . Huang et al. designed an ε-Nash equilibrium for linear quadratic mean field games with discount costs based on the proposed Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) approach [18] , [19] . The NCE approach was then applied to the cases with long run average costs [24] and with Markov jump parameters [35] , respectively. Lasry and Lions independently introduced the model of mean field games and studied the well-posed problem of the limiting partial differential equations [23] . For further literature, readers are referred to [17] , [28] , [35] , [36] for mean field games with major players, [5] , [9] for time-inconsistent mean field games, and [38] for oblivious equilibrium in dynamic games.
Besides noncooperative games, social optima in mean field models have also drawn much attention. The social optimum control refers to that all the players cooperate to optimize the common social cost-the sum of individual cost, which is usually regarded as a type of team decision problem [29] , [14] . Huang et al. considered social optima in mean field LQG control, and provided an asymptotic teamoptimal solution [20] . Wang and Zhang [37] investigated a mean field social optimal problem where a Markov jump parameter appears as a common source of randomness. For further literature, see [21] , [2] , [25] for social optima in mixed games, team-optimal control with finite population and partial information, social optima in static mean field games.
Mathematical models can only be approximations of the real world. Some parts of a model may be inexact. Thus, it is worthy to study the mean field control with model uncertainty [3] . Huang and Huang [15] , [16] investigated the mean field model with a global uncertainty term. In [15] , the authors considered the "hard constraint" case (the disturbance is specified with a bound) under which some substantial difficulty arises after the Lagrange multiplier is introduced. In [16] , the authors adopted the "soft constraint" approach [3] , [7] , [10] by removing the bound of the disturbance while the effort is penalized in the cost function. The work [32] , [27] considered the case that each agent is paired with the local disturbance as an adversarial player, and provided an ε-Nash equilibrium by tackling a Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation combined with a fixed-point analysis.
This paper investigates mean field LQG social optimum control with a common uncertain drift, where both dynamics and costs of agents involve mean field coupled terms. To address the model uncertainty, a minus quadratic penalty term of the drift is incorporated into the cost functional. We first obtain a set of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) by analyzing the variation of the centralized maximization cost with respect to drift uncertainty. With the help of the Riccati equation, we further give a feedback type of the "worst" drift for a social optimum problem. Next, we construct an auxiliary optimal control problem based on the social variational derivation and the person-byperson optimality principle. By solving the auxiliary problem combined with consistent mean field approximations, a set of decentralized feedback strategies is designed and further shown to be asymptotically optimal.
The main contributions of the paper are summarized as follows. (i) Social optimum control is studied for mean field models with a common uncertain drift, where coupled terms are included in not only costs but also dynamics of agents. By the Riccati equation approach we design a set of decentralized feedback strategies, which has better anti-interference performance than open-loop strategies. (ii) From consistency requirements in mean field approximations a system of differential equations is derived, where the existence condition of solutions is characterized by a Riccati equation, instead of a fixed-point analysis. (iii) By perturbation analysis, the decentralized strategies are shown be asymptotically robust optimal.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II formulates the social optimization problem with drift uncertainty. In Section III, we tackle the centralized control with respect to drift uncertainty by variational analysis and further obtain a feedback type of the maximum drift. In Section IV, we first construct an auxiliary optimal control problem based on the social variational derivation, and then by solving this problem combined with consistent mean field approximations, a set of decentralized strategies is designed. In Section V, we prove that the set of decentralized strategies is asymptotically optimal by perturbation analysis. Section VI concludes the paper.
Notation: Suppose that (Ω, F , {F t } 0≤t≤T , P) is a complete filtered probability space. Throughout this paper, we denote by R k the k-dimensional Euclidean space, R n×k the set of all n × k matrices. We use ∥ · ∥ to denote the norm of a Euclidean space, or the Frobenius norm for matrices. For a symmetric matrix Q and a vector z, ∥z∥ 2 Q = z T Qz; for two vectors x, y, ⟨x, y⟩ = x T y. For a matrix M, M > 0 means that M is positive definite, and λ max (M) and λ min (M) are the largest and smallest eigenvalues of M,
For convenience of presentation, we use C (or C 1 ,C 2 , . . .) to denote a generic constant which does not depend on the population size N and may vary from place to place.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a large population systems with N agents. Agent i evolves by the following stochastic differential equation:
where x i ∈ R n and u i ∈ R r are the state and the input of agent i. The cost function of agent i is given by
where Q,
is an unknown disturbance, which reflects an effect imposed to each agent by the external environment. Take {F t } 0≤t≤T as the natural filtration generated by the Nddimensional Brownian motion (W 1 (t), · · · ,W N (t)), and F = F T . The admissible strategy set is given by
The main goal of the paper is to seek a set of decentralized strategies to optimize the social cost under soft constraint for the system (1)
We make the assumption of the initial state.
The optimal control problem with respect to drift uncertainty is the problem
For the further existence analysis, we assume (A2) Problem (P1 ′ ) is convex in f . Some sufficient and necessary conditions to ensure (A2) may be found in [31] .
By examining the variation ofJ (N) soc , we first get the following result.
Theorem 1: Suppose that (A2) holds. Then (P1 ′ ) has a (unique) minimizer if and only if the following equation system admits a (unique) solution (
Necessity. Suppose thatf is a minimizer to Problem (P1 ′ ).x i is the state of agent i under the controlǔ i and the driftf . (4) where i = 1, 2, · · · , N. Then we have 0 =δJ (N)
where α i and β j i are to be determined. Then by Itô's formula,
dt. (7) Note that
It follows by (5)-(7) that
which leads to
This implies that the equation system (3) admits a solution (x i ,p i ). Sufficiency. Suppose (3) admits a (unique) solution (x i ,p i ).
Assume (A3) (9) has a solution in C([0, T ], R n ). By the local Lipschitz continuous property of the quadratic vector function, (9) must admit a unique local solution in a small time duration [T 0 , T ]. The global existence of the solution for t ∈ [−∞, T ] or [0, T ] can be referred to [12] , [1] . IV. DECENTRALIZED STRATEGY DESIGN After the "worst" driftf is applied, we have the following optimal control problem (P2): minimize J
We can show that Problem (P2) has the asymptotic convexity. Due to the space limitation, the proof is omitted. Lemma 3: There exists an integer N 0 such that Problem (P2) is uniformly convex for N ≥ N 0 .
A. Social variational derivation
Note that the social optimum implies the person-by-person optimality [37] . We now provide a transformation of the original social optimum problem by the person-by-person optimality. Suppose thatû = (û 1 , · · · ,û N ) is a minimizer to Problem (P2). Letx i correspond toû i , andx (N) 
We further have
By this with (13) , one can obtain
The zero first variational condition combined with the mean field approximation gives
wherex ∈ C([0, T ], R n ) is an approximation ofx (N) . From observation, the above equation is the zero variation condition for the optimal control problem with the cost function
where the fifth line is obtained by an exchange of order of the integration.
B. Mean field approximation
Based on (14), we construct an auxiliary optimal control problem (P3):
, v(T ) =Ḡ T Hx(T ).
By the variational method we have the optimal control of (P3). Due to the space limitation, the proof is omitted.
Theorem 4: Problem (P3) has a unique optimal control
where (k i , ζ i ) is a unique adaptive solution to the following backward stochastic differential equation
Let k i = Kx i + φ. Then by (15) and (19),
Besides, applying (18) into (15), we have
. From this with mean field approximation, one can obtaiṅ (22) , (16) , (17) , and (21),
For further analysis, we assume: (A4) (23) admits a solution in C([0, T ], R 4n ). Note that (23) can be taken as a FBSDE without diffusion terms. The condition of contraction mapping in Theorem 5.1 of [26] holds necessarily. Thus, (23) must admit a unique solution in a small time duration [T 0 , T ]. Furthermore, we give a sufficient condition that ensures (A4). LetĀ
Then (23) can be written as 
Proposition 5: If the Riccati differential equatioṅ
By (24),
Thus, we obtaiṅ
Since (25) admits a solution, then (26) has a solution. Applying z = Yx + α into (24), we havė
which implies (23) admits a unique solution.
V. ASYMPTOTIC OPTIMALITY Letû
where K and φ are determined by (20) and (23), respectively. Denote the state under the controlû i byx i , i = 1, · · · , N. x (N) = 1 N ∑ N i=1x i . Lemma 6: Assume that (A1)-(A4) hold. For the system (1)-(2), we have
Proof. It follows by (12) that
From this and (16),
which completes the proof. Lemma 7: There exists a constant C 0 independent of N such that
Afterû is applied, the closed-loop state satisfies
From this and (29),
We now give the result of asymptotic optimality. Due to space limitation, some details of the proof are omitted, which are available in [33] .
Theorem 8: Assume that (A1)-(A4) hold. For the system (1)-(2), the set of control lawsû = (û 1 , · · · ,û N ) given by (27) has asymptotic robust social optimality, i.e.,
Main Idea of Proof.
The key of the proof is to show 1
. Besides Lemmas 6 and 7, we use two other lemmas. where k (N) = 1 N ∑ N i=1 k i and v is given by (23) . VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS This paper considers a class of mean field linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) social optimum problem with global drift uncertainty. Both the dynamics and the costs of agents contain mean field coupled terms. By using the soft control approach, a set of decentralized strategies is designed by optimizing the worst-case cost subject to the consistent mean field approximation. Such set of strategies is further shown to be asymptotically optimal by perturbation analysis.
